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Constitutional Reform Processes
and Political Parties
Principles for Practice
This publication provides a set of guiding principles for constitutional reform based on practical 
experiences of constitutional reform processes in a number of countries (Bolivia, Ghana, Indonesia, 
Iraq, Kenya, Malawi, Zimbabwe and South Africa). While the primary focus of the publication is on the 
role of political parties in constitution-building processes, the publication is also of relevance to other 
actors involved in similar processes as it provides the reader with an overview of common phases, 
characteristics, challenges and guiding principles that may be customised to country specific contexts.
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“IpersonallywitnessedthedemocratictransitioninChilefromnearby
whilelivingthere.Today,manypeopleinotherregionsintheworld
arealsobravelytakingtothestreetsdemandingpoliticalfreedomand
economicjustice.Thesecountriesare–orwillbe–confrontedwith
theneedtoelaboratenewconstitutionsthatreflecttheidealsandhopes
ofordinarycitizens.Iamconvincedthattheinternationalcommunity
hasausefulroletoplayinassistingthesecountries.Butmodestyand
respectforcountryownershipisessential.Iverymuchwelcomethis
publicationandamconfidentitmakesausefulcontributiontothe
reformprocessescurrentlyunderwayinsomanycountries.”
Hon. Kathleen Ferrier
Member of Parliament of the Netherlands, 
Former Chair of the African Studies Centre in Leiden
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
–
TheNetherlandsInstituteforMultipartyDemo-
cracy(nimd)isademocracyassistanceorganisation
establishedbypoliticalpartiesintheNetherlands
tosupportpoliticalpartiesinyoungdemocracies.
nimdspecificallyprovidesassistancetoprocessesof
dialoguebetweenpoliticalpartiesinprogramme
countries,theinstitutionaldevelopmentofpar-
liamentarypartiesandnetworksofcooperation
betweenpoliticalandcivilsociety.nimdadheres
tostrictprinciplesofownership,neutralityand
transparencyandacknowledgesthatdemocracies
arehomegrown.
nimdhasprovidedsupportincontext-specificways
andontherequestofitspartnersinconstitutional
reformprocessesincountriessuchasBolivia,
Ecuador,Ghana,Kenya,Malawi,Tanzania,Zambia
andZimbabwe.
nimdmaintainsasmallknowledgeandcommuni-
cationcentrethatnotonlyfacilitatesSouth-South
exchangesonspecifictopicsbutalsoregularly
developspublications,videosandothermateri-
als.Moreinformationcanbefoundonitswebsite:
www.nimd.org
International IDEA
–
TheInternationalInstituteforDemocracyand
ElectoralAssistance(Internationalidea)isan
intergovernmentalorganisationthatsupports
sustainabledemocracyworldwide.Itsprimary
missionistosupportsustainabledemocraticchange
byprovidingcomparativeknowledge,assistingin
democraticreformandinfluencingpoliciesand
politics.
The African Studies Centre
–
TheAfricanStudiesCentre(asc)istheonly
academicresearchinstituteintheNetherlands
devotedentirelytothestudyofAfrica.Itundertakes
scientificresearchonSub-SaharanAfricainthe
socialsciencesandthehumanities.
TheascmaintainsclosetieswithDutchuniversities
andresearchschoolsandhasvariouslinkswiththe
MinistryofForeignAffairsandnon-government
organisations.Internationally,theaschaswell-es-
tablishedcontactswithacademicnetworksinAfrica
asmostofitsresearchiscarriedoutincooperation
withAfricancolleaguesandinstitutions.
TheaschoststhewebsiteConnecting-Africa,
agatewaytoAfricanresearchinformationand
materialsproducedworldwide.Itprovidesaccess
toover30,000publications,informationonmore
than1,300Africaexpertsandover800organisations
withexpertiseinAfrica.AccesstoConnecting-
AfricaandmoreinformationontheAfricanStudies
Centrecanbefoundonitswebsite:
www.ascleiden.nl
Internationalideahasaspecificconstitution-
buildingprogrammethatraisesawarenessof
theroleconstitution-buildingprocessesplayin
managingconflictandconsolidatingdemocracy.
Thisworkinvolvesprovidingtechnicalassistance,
knowledgeandaccesstolessonlearningtonational
andinternationalactorsengagedinprocessesof
constitution-building.Theinstitutionalsoserves
aglobalcommunityofconstitution-building
practitionersthroughphysicalandvirtualspaces
fordialogue.Moreinformationcanbefoundon
itswebsite:www.idea.int
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Foreword
It is with profound pleasure that I am writing a 
preface to this publication, the subject of which is 
as historical as it is contemporary. It is a subject 
that deserves our attention. At a more personal 
level, the subject of constitutional reform is so dear 
to my heart. For one thing, this takes me down the 
cherished memory lane of my times when I had to 
participate in a constitution-making process from 
scratch for my own country, Mozambique, decades 
of years ago, early at the beginning of the 1970’s. 
This also brings me back to the challenges I faced 
when I spearheaded the deep revision of that same 
constitution at the end of the 1990’s in order to make 
it adequate to the development of our country and 
the big changes in the world relations. For another, 
experience now teaches us that constitution-making 
and constitutional reform are at the very core of 
state building and democratic consolidation. For 
this reason, the making or remaking of constitutions 
should not be construed as a legal project to be 
left to lawyers. Nor should this agenda be the sole 
preserve of politicians. 
 A constitution is the most important piece of 
legislation that any country has. Ideally, a constitution 
should reflect not only the history of the nation 
but also, and in my view most importantly, it must 
mirror the interests and aspirations of its people 
with regard to how they wish to be governed. The 
constitution should define the type of government 
people want, the powers their government should 
have and the limits of those powers. A constitution 
is, in its simplest form, the social contract between 
those who govern and the governed. As such, the 
making and remaking of a constitution is a societal 
and national project in which all sectors of society 
must participate. In other words, the process leading 
to a new or revised constitution is as important 
as the content if both of these (the process and 
content) are to be regarded not only democratic 
and legitimate, but also inclusive and popularly 
accepted. This is why I am particularly delighted that 
this publication is informed not only by the theory 
of constitution-making but, and in my view more 
importantly, what actually works and does not work 
in practice. Of course, there will never be a one-size-
fits-all solution but it does help tremendously  
to learn from the praxis. After all, experience is the 
best teacher. 
Being a former President and a politician myself, I 
must also highlight the importance of dialogue in the 
process of constitutional reform, especially between 
and among political actors. Oftentimes because of 
their partisan interests, political actors can be the 
greatest obstacles to this very important democratic 
undertaking, especially when some of them feel 
that the outcome will to them be a zero-sum game. 
Through dialogue, stakeholders tend to understand 
each other’s fears and aspirations much better. 
Consensus while at the same time upholding the 
basic virtues of a democratic constitutional reform 
process can best be obtained in a set-up that gives 
each of the parties concerned a chance to be heard 
and to be identified with the process. I therefore 
congratulate all those who have contributed to 
this publication for sharing with the audience the 
role of political parties and inter-party dialogue in 
constitutional reform processes. It is my hope that 
this publication will be well received and well utilised 
in the pursuit of democratic consolidation.
His	Excellency	Joaquim	Chissano
Former President of Mozambique and Chair  
of the Africa Forum of Former Heads of State  
and Government
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Constitutional reform processes within a particular 
country are often about responding to broad 
challenges of peace building, reconciliation, 
inclusion and socio-economic development in 
a way that is seen as legitimate and is widely 
accepted. As the demands placed on constitutions 
have increased, they have become complex and 
lengthy, and hence more challenging to design 
and implement. The stakes are often high in 
constitutional reform processes themselves, with 
vested interests and national divisions in play. 
One major challenge is the need for actors with 
short-term interests, who may be leading the draf-
ting of reforms, to ensure the long-term durability 
of a constitution for future generations. Political 
parties, often the key actors in constitution-building 
processes, are critical in addressing this challenge. 
Political parties have a unique contribution to make 
to constitution-building processes and to ensuring 
their long-term sustainability and legitimacy. In 
particular, dialogue between political parties can  
help overcome the temptation in politics to focus  
on short-term gain in order to allow constitutional 
reform to be durable across generations. 
This publication provides a set of guiding principles 
for constitutional reform. These have been taken 
from practical experiences of constitutional reform in 
a number of countries. As the case studies illustrate, 
although country-specific reform processes may 
be unique in terms of (priority) objectives, context, 
popular involvement and achievements, these  
reform processes do go through similar phases.  
For instance, prior to the actual content deliberations, 
there is the need to decide on the way the reform 
will be institutionalised and to inform, educate 
and consult ordinary citizens and specific interest 
groups. Once an agreement has been reached on 
a new (or revised) constitution, each country goes 
through an adoption and implementation phase. 
As a result of these commonalities, we have been 
able to identify some common best practices that 
cut across these phases. Bolstered by empirical 
evidence from academic reflections, it is these best 
practices that are presented in this publication as 
guiding principles. 
It is not the intention of this publication, however, 
to provide a blueprint for the complex, unique and 
volatile processes of constitutional reform. Instead it 
aims to provide political parties and other institutions 
involved in similar processes with an accessible 
overview of common phases, characteristics, chal-
lenges and guiding principles for which country-
specific solutions need to be found.
 
Hans	Bruning
Executive Director NIMD
Vidar	Helgesen
Secretary General International IDEA 
Ton	Dietz
Director ASC
Preface
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1  Constitutional reforms 
and guiding principles 
The practice of constitutional reform as it is observed in this publication demon-
strates broad acceptance of the importance of constitutional principles in temper-
ing the political interests that will unavoidably shape these reforms in different 
contexts. This is a move away from practice to principles. In many cases, political 
parties have espoused these principles upfront and then struggled to live up to 
them, while in other cases, political parties have discovered the importance of  
pre-commitment to principles through their own trials by fire.
These guiding principles, which are intended to serve as a useful reference for 
political parties driving the reforms in their countries, are formulated in relation to 
different phases of constitutional reform processes. 
1.1	Preparatory	phase
Constitutional	reform	processes	tend	to	be	characterised	by	tensions	and	a	
wide	diversity	of	views	and	interests.	Creating	solid	foundations	at	a	prelimi-
nary	stage	helps	to	protect	the	deliberations	from	collapsing	as	a	result	of	
these	inherent	tensions. 
Guiding principles for the preparatory phase are particularly aimed at reaching: 
•  A preliminary agreement that explicitly states why a country wants to embark 
upon constitutional reform, what the main objectives are and who the main 
actors will be; 
•  A public statement in which political parties explicitly commit themselves to 
safeguarding the public interest throughout the upcoming reform process and 
express their willingness to pro-actively engage in consensus-building;
•  A preliminary agreement between the main political actors and between political 
and civic actors on the guiding democratic principles as benchmarks for the 
upcoming constitutional reform process;  
•  A widely accepted agreement by both politicians and civil society on the legally 
embedded institutional mechanisms and their mandate for the upcoming con-
stitutional reform process (including a clear accord on how to progress from  
the old to the new constitution);   
•  An informal or legally binding political agreement in which all major political par-
ties commit themselves to adopting the outcome of the upcoming constitutional 
deliberations without fundamental changes;
NIMD / IDEA / ASC
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•  A widely accepted agreement by politicians and civil society on the decision-
making process throughout the upcoming constitutional reform process;  
•  A widely accepted agreement by politicians and civil society on the roadmap, 
timeframe and budget for the upcoming constitutional reform process;  
•  An enabling environment, notably with freedom of expression and press free-
dom as well as a vibrant independent civil society, to inspire participation by 
an informed public during the constitutional reform process;
•  An agreement on the principal constitutional issues to be presented to the 
general public for awareness-raising and consultation; and  
•  An agreement on the way popular contributions will be analysed (that is, 
quantitatively and/or qualitatively) and weighted.
1.2	Awareness	raising	and	consultative	phase
Actively	engaging	an	informed	citizenry	throughout	the	reform	process	
contributes	to	the	popular	legitimacy	of	the	revised	or	renewed	constitution,	
particularly	at	the	normative	level.	
The guiding principles for this phase aim to stimulate the development of: 
•  Instruments and means to provide information in a balanced and accessible 
way to ordinary citizens on the main reform issues at stake as well as the 
upcoming reform process;
•  A context within which people feel free and secure to express their views 
during this phase of the reform process;
•  Civic education programmes on the principal constitutional issues that will 
enable people to participate in an informed manner; 
•  Possibilities for ordinary citizens, including minority groups and marginalised 
groups, to participate within the reform process; 
•  A pro-active role for political parties as the principal intermediary institutions 
connecting citizens with constitutional content; and 
•  Opportunities for specific institutions to monitor the neutrality of the aware-
ness-raising and consultative efforts.
1.3	Content	deliberation	and	drafting	phase
Deliberation	on	constitutional	content	and	its	actual	drafting	are	at	the	core	
of	the	entire	reform	process.	The	decision-making	process,	which	will	fre-
quently	need	a	deadlock-breaking	mechanism	to	enable	consensus	building	
between	the	various	contradictory	views,	is	particularly	crucial	at	this	stage.	
Guiding principles for the deliberative phase strive to encourage agreements on: 
•  A specific deadlock-breaking mechanism if the ordinary decision-making 
process fails to resolve different interests and viewpoints; 
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•  The level of inclusivity allowing majority and minority groups (or groups with 
a traditionally weaker voice in society) to partake and express their views, as 
equals, within the constitutional reform process;
•  A formal statement by all participants emphasising that the constitutional delib-
erations must serve the public good as well as more partisan-specific interests; 
•  A well functioning decision-making and consensus-building mechanism that 
enables the bridging of divergent views;
•  Transparent feedback mechanisms between participants and their interest 
groups and the general population during the deliberations;
•  Ways of establishing and maintaining an environment conducive to delibera-
tions where all participants are at ease and can express their views freely;
•  An external monitoring mechanism for the actual deliberations;
•  Institutional guarantees that provide a certain degree of autonomy and integrity 
in the deliberations and limit direct external interference within the process; and 
•  The need for input from legal experts to ensure coherence between the various 
constitutional articles agreed upon.
1.4	Adoption	and	implementation	phase
Constitutional	reform	does	not	end	with	the	adoption	of	a	new	or	revised		
constitution.	The	transformation	of	the	adopted	changes	into	subsidiary		
laws	is	a	lengthy,	sensitive	and	indispensable	part	of	the	reform	process.	
Guiding principles for this final phase specifically aim to promote:
•  A political agreement stipulating that agreements reached during the delibera-
tive phase will be presented to Parliament (or a referendum) by the execu-
tive branch of government and adopted by Parliament without fundamental 
changes; 
•  The unrestricted monitoring of the adoption and implementation process 
by non-governmental, media and political organisations; 
•  A political agreement that ensures the adopted articles will be translated into 
subsidiary law within a specific timeframe;
•  Accountability mechanisms that allow ordinary citizens to hold their representa-
tives accountable for the agreements reached; 
•  Strategies to educate and inform the general citizenry, in an accessible manner, 
about the final results of the deliberative stage (for example, in preparation for 
a possible referendum); and
•  A mechanism to ensure that the results of the deliberative stage obtain wide 
popular legitimacy. 
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The	national	soul	
Often referred to as a country’s supreme law, the constitution provides much 
more than an overarching legal framework for society. It regulates political power 
and strongly affects relations between society and the state. A constitution can 
play an important role in forging a common identity and creating institutional 
spaces where citizens interact on an equal basis with their leaders. From this 
perspective, as recognised by Justice Ismail Mahomed, a former Chief Justice 
of South Africa and the Supreme Court of Namibia, a constitution is nothing less 
than a ‘mirror reflecting the national soul’. 
For a constitution to be embedded in such a political, social and cultural way, 
the process through which it is drafted (or re-drafted) is of great importance. 
There is increasing evidence that constitutions enjoy broader legitimacy if they 
emerge from inclusive, representative and participatory processes that allow all 
political actors to forge common institutions. Political parties, being intermediary 
organisations that aggregate political interests and views, have a crucial role to 
play in this respect. However, political parties also need to be better prepared 
when faced with the responsibility of actively participating in such important and 
politically sensitive reform processes. This is what makes principles like those 
espoused in this document, as well as efforts to agree on these principles in 
advance, extremely useful.
Constitutional	reform is an important vehicle on the road to democratic 
consolidation. And as intermediary institutions between the state and ordinary 
citizens, political parties should be in the driving seat.
Waves	of	reform
The first wave of African constitutions following independence mostly served 
to transfer power to national elites, who then consolidated and centralised 
this power via constitutional amendments. National elites sometimes used 
constitutions to dominate the political system, justifying this as an essential  
part of buttressing the developmental state economic model. However, different 
economic indicators show that this constitutional model did not produce the 
intended economic results and, instead of encouraging economic progress, 
often resulted in legacies that have been dubbed a paradox of ‘constitutions 
without constitutionalism’.
2  Constitutional reforms in 
democratisation
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It is not surprising therefore that the new wave of constitutional reforms since 
the end of the Cold War and the fall of communism has sought different 
constitutional models. At an institutional level, these models are differentiated 
by their formal emphasis on electoral procedures, multiparty parliaments, 
independent courts, decentralised power structures and more inclusive political 
institutions that take account of diversity and gender criteria. 
In recent years, quite a number of African countries have been taking yet 
another look at their constitutions. In Kenya and Zimbabwe, for example, reform 
processes have taken place as part of a negotiated settlement following a 
severe political crisis. The reforms in countries such as Ghana, Malawi, Mali and 
Tanzania on the other hand have been predominantly oriented towards further 
enhancing and consolidating democracy. In these and other countries, societal 
divisions continue to prove pervasive in both formal and informal institutions, 
including those in civil society and religious sectors. Proponents of constitutional 
reform – some of them within organised political parties – are increasingly 
observing that fundamental societal change will only emerge from constitution 
reforms that successfully catalyse changes in political culture in favour of shared 
values, constitutionalism, respect for the rights of citizens and the rule of law. 
These constitutional reform processes have therefore aimed at much more than 
designing new laws and institutions, as they are processes concerning questions 
of the nature of the state and its political culture. 
In reforming political systems, the balance of power between government 
branches and the way politicians and citizens relate is obviously a delicate 
matter. The interests of the current political elites strongly affect the potential 
for and direction of reform. Balancing their specific short-term interests on the 
one hand and long-term national interests on the other is a major challenge 
confronting constitutional reform processes. 
Sustainable fundamental change is premised on constitutional reforms 
that succeed in catalysing the emergence of stable, democratic nations. 
Such constitutional reforms have to contend with more than merely formally 
designing institutions; they also need to balance the competing short-term 
interests of key political actors and the long-term public good.
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Within these various phases of reform, political parties play a key role in the 
drafting or redrafting of a constitution. The success or otherwise of reform 
processes in generating constitutions that reflect the people’s ideals and are 
considered legitimate by ordinary citizens depends to a large extent on the 
functioning of political parties. 
This section does not intend to provide a rigid model for the roles and respon-
sibilities of political parties in a process as diverse, complex and challenging as 
constitutional reform. It instead offers an overview of potentially constructive con-
tributions based on practical experiences gained, and provides various inspiring 
empirical illustrations. 
Political parties play a prominent role throughout the entire constitutional reform 
process, from the preparatory stage to the implementation phase. It is important 
to recognise that political parties can potentially make contributions in three 
different capacities, namely:
• As individual political parties;
• As members of inter-party dialogue platforms; and
• As political parties in relation to other stakeholders.
Individual	parties
As highlighted in Section 1, recently renewed or revised constitutions are now 
increasingly expected to provide reliable democratic checks and balances, and 
must be considered legitimate in the eyes of the general population. 
This Section provides an overview of the contributions individual political parties 
can potentially make, in line with their core functions in society. However, 
special attention will be paid to the fact that individual parties, in contrast to 
other institutions, are driven by a quest for political power, as this considerably 
influences their role in the constitutional reform process.  
Constitutions set out a particular political framework, which affects the 
opportunities of individual parties to gain power and also formally determines 
how power is distributed. The stakes are thus high for political parties 
participating in constitutional reform. The role they play within a constitutional 
reform process is influenced by a combination of private, partisan and public 
interests.
3  Constitutional reform and 
political parties 
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Private	interests
The agenda of a political party within a constitutional reform process is partly 
shaped by the personal ambitions of its main representatives. This has been 
illustrated by attempts by incumbent presidents to extend the limits of their 
constitutional terms. While such efforts have been successfully blocked in 
Malawi, Nigeria and Zambia, long-term presidents in Burkina Faso, Uganda, 
Togo, Namibia and Chad have been able to maintain their personal position in 
power beyond the original length allowed. 
Controversies over age limits, attestations of indigeneity and educational 
requirements for presidential candidates have also been inspired by personal 
interests. In Malawi, a suggestion to introduce an age limit for presidential 
candidates as part of the constitutional amendments was blocked, as all 
the candidates for the main parties would have been negatively affected. In 
Zambia, autochthony criteria successfully prevented an opposition leader from 
participating in the elections. However, taking the private interests of incumbent 
rulers into consideration has also proved constructive in the transition to 
democracy in various countries. In Ghana, for example, President Jerry Rawlings 
freely committed to reforming the constitution and allowing civilian rule in 1992, 
partly because of a clause in the proposed new constitution that provided 
immunity to all past leaders of coups in Ghana, a group which included himself. 
The personal interests of political actors outside the executive are also at 
stake in processes of constitutional reform. The kind of electoral system 
agreed upon, for example, has an impact on the future career possibilities of 
figure 3.1
Constitutional reform  
and political party interests
Public Partisan
Private
Reform
Process
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incumbent parliamentarians. Similarly, strengthening the separation of powers 
between government branches by avoiding the appointment of ministers from 
within Parliament directly goes against the individual ambitions of Members of 
Parliament (MPs). 
Such private interests can be very influential within constitutional reform 
processes. The way the process of constitutional reform is institutionalised 
affects the potential scope of these private and short-term ambitions. 
Nevertheless, the case studies presented in Section 4 clearly demonstrate that 
such institutionalisation does not necessarily protect the reform process from 
personal or partisan interests. The success of constitutional reform processes 
primarily depends on continuous political bargaining, inter-party negotiations 
and consensus building. 
While the proposed guiding principles in this publication offer a source of 
reference for these delicate inter-party processes, political parties also have 
individual responsibility to ensure constitutional reform does not lose sight of  
the public interest. This requires, amongst other things, the further anchoring  
of basic democratic values within political parties, as will be briefly elucidated  
in the next section.
Public	interests
The involvement of individual political parties in constitution-building goes well 
beyond the private interests of their representatives. Political parties can also 
significantly contribute to safeguarding the public interests of constitutional reform 
processes. The exact manner in which this is done is highly context-specific but 
generating commitment to a core set of basic democratic values within individual 
political parties is crucial. Values that encourage political parties’ participation in 
constitutional reform processes to safeguard the public interest include:
•  Inclusivity of the main political and social voices, including minority 
groups; 
• Tolerance for divergent viewpoints and interests; 
• Transparency of the reform process; 
• Participation of citizens (information, consultation and representation); and
• Consensus	building with other stakeholders involved. 
Partisan	interests
Partisan interests are key drivers of constitutional reform processes as the case 
studies in the next Section illustrate. Political parties have different interests in the 
kind of electoral system selected, whether it be a first-past-the-post, proportional 
representation, multi-member constituency or single-member constituency 
system. 
This applies also to the political system selected – for example, a presidential, 
semi-presidential or parliamentarian system – as well as the degree of devolution 
they favour (level centralisation, decentralisation, or federalism) or the role of 
religious matters (secular state, state religion). As divergent views on these and 
many other issues are founded on specific partisan interests, agreeing on a new 
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constitution requires a delicate process of inter-party negotiations. 
As will be apparent from the case studies in Section 4 and the cross-country 
comparisons made in Section 5, constitutional reform processes tend to 
generate political compromises on a restricted number of the most pressing 
constitutional challenges rather than ideal constitutions. 
The proposed guiding principles encourage and inspire political parties to jointly 
shape constitutional reform processes, in consultation with other stakeholders, in 
ways that generate an outcome popularly regarded as legitimate. But individual 
parties also have the potential to strengthen their role within the constitutional 
reform process as principal intermediary institutions connecting people with 
policies.  
In line with academic conclusions, party representatives from the countries 
included in this publication observe that political parties perform weakly in this 
respect. They indicate that their parties often fail to embed the reform process 
within society or to provide effective channels for consultation and participation. 
Rather, a select group of national party representatives, in consultation with a 
limited number of experts, usually defines party positions on constitutional issues 
and on matters related to the reform process.
Based on the core functions of a political party in society, figure 3.2 provides an 
overview of their potential contribution to the formulation of a popularly accepted 
constitution. Promoting the role of political parties in connecting people with 
reform processes is essential for the consolidation and popularisation of 
democracy in society.  
Functions	
political	
parties
Education Aggregation Articulation Recruitment Oversight
Constitutio-
nal Reform 
Process
Raise 
awareness 
and educate 
citizens, and 
party 
members 
(supporters) 
in particular
Collect and 
balance 
views from 
society at 
large, and 
party 
members 
(supporters) 
in particular, 
before elabo-
rating party 
positions
Communi-
cate party 
positions on 
key reform 
issues, both 
internally and 
externally
Internally 
elect party 
represen-
tatives to 
participate 
in the reform 
process
Monitor 
progress of 
reform and 
provide feed-
back to party 
members 
(supporters) 
and citizens 
in general
figure 3.2
Overview of potential roles  
of individual parties
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Inter-party	dialogue
While issues related to constitutional reform have not featured prominently in 
internal party activities, political parties have collectively played a very influential 
and constructive role. In fact, the case studies presented in Section 4 clearly 
illustrate the determining impact of inter-party consensus building on the 
successful completion of the reform process. Such processes of inter-party 
dialogue at various party levels can be highly volatile, frequently derailed and 
frustratingly slow in yielding results but are nevertheless indispensible to the 
gradual establishment and strengthening of the democratic rules of the game.
 
In an increasing number of African countries, political parties have jointly 
established and institutionalised platforms of inter-party dialogue. The boards  
of these so-called Centres for Multi-Party Democracy (CMDs) often consist of  
the Secretaries-General of the parliamentarian parties and representatives of  
the non-parliamentary parties. Independent staff members assist in formulating 
and implementing the agenda formulated by the political parties themselves.
The role of and possibilities for inter-party dialogue greatly depend on the context 
in which dialogue takes place. The following sections provide an overview of a 
wide variety of experiences of inter-party negotiations in constitutional reforms 
and make comparisons between them. This section highlights three specific 
advantages of the more institutionalised platforms of inter-party dialogue on the 
African continent. The three principal beneficial contributions of these inter-party 
dialogue platforms to sensitive constitutional reform processes are: 
• Enhancing personal relations and building trust between political actors;
• Enhancing political consensus in preparation for reform processes; and
• Enhancing consensus building on contentious content issues.
Personal	bonding	and	trust-building	amongst	political	actors
Elaborating a new constitution or revising an existing one is a delicate and 
sensitive process. The way power is formally distributed in a society is often 
subject to change. Constructive relations amongst political party representatives, 
though not often emphasised, are crucially important for enabling inter-party 
negotiations and driving reforms. 
The reality, however, is that levels of distrust between rival politicians are usually 
high, particularly in conflict or post-conflict situations. Before the numerous 
technicalities of a constitutional reform process can be tabled and discussed, 
some level of trust between the participating (political) actors needs to be 
established. Processes of trust-building are demanding and often disrupted, and 
require continuous focus throughout the reform process. The following example 
from Zimbabwe illustrates this.
3 Constitutional reform and political parties
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Trust-building	in	a	polarised	context – Zimbabwe
While the Zimbabwean constitutional reform process aims to provide a way out 
of the country’s deep political crisis, it has obviously been severely affected by 
the considerable levels of polarisation between Zimbabwe’s three main political 
parties. 
When the Constitution Parliamentary Select Committee (COPAC), predominantly 
composed of representatives of ZANU-PF, MDC-M and MDC-T, was set up, it 
immediately faced numerous practical challenges. The Zimbabwe Institute (ZI) 
was asked to assist in fundraising, capacity building, the drafting of a working 
plan and establishing a permanent secretariat. 
However, in order to kick-start this round of reforms, it was much more important 
to address the extreme levels of personal mistrust between the parties. One 
of the key interventions in this early stage was the facilitation, through the 
Zimbabwe Institute, of various exchanges with South African politicians who had 
personally initiated the dialogue process that much later brought about an end to 
Apartheid. These regional exchanges were then followed up by frequent informal 
meetings, both inside and outside Zimbabwe, between COPAC members. 
COPAC members have now been working together for over two years. While 
divergent partisan loyalties and interests as well as extreme forms of political 
competition outside the committee strongly impact on and frequently frustrate 
their ability to collaborate, personal bonding within the committee across 
the political divide has contributed to overcoming some of the challenges 
encountered. 
The outcome of the constitutional reform process remains uncertain but, in the 
absence of alternative solutions, these personal relations underlying platforms 
of dialogue remain a key ingredient for a peaceful resolution to the relentless 
political challenges that Zimbabwe faces.
Enhancing	political	consensus-building	prior	to	reform	processes
In order to ensure the legitimacy of constitutional processes as well as their 
sustainability, it is of crucial importance to facilitate an agreement between the 
main political actors (that is, parties) on the need for and exact modalities of  
any upcoming reform process. 
Inter-party dialogue platforms allow political parties to gradually build consensus 
on the way a constitutional reform process is to be shaped. For example, prior 
to the commencement of reform processes, political parties in a number of 
countries also agreed on a set of ‘basic democratic principles’, which were 
expected to be reflected within the new (or revised) constitution.
Such a homegrown agenda, created across the political divide, enhances the 
commitment of all the participating political parties to the reform process and the 
adoption of its final outcome. It also generates a legitimate basis for any support 
provided by the international community. The political consensus established in 
Ghana presents an inspiring example.
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Inter-party	dialogue	as	fundamental	to	reform – Ghana
The Ghanaian Political Parties Platform (GPPP) brings together the Secretaries-
General of the eight main political parties and is facilitated by the Institute of 
Economic Affairs (IEA). Following extensive public debate on constitutional 
matters, this platform decided to commission a study of the main democratic 
shortcomings of Ghana’s 1992 Constitution. The results were translated into a 
‘Democratic Consolidation Strategy Paper’ that highlighted 30 major issues that 
required modification in order to further advance Ghanaian democracy. 
In the run-up to the 2008 elections, all the political parties included a pledge for 
constitutional reform in their manifestos. Following his election as Republican 
President, Prof. John Atta Mills established a Constitution Review Commission 
in January 2010. The main opposition party initially disagreed with the executive 
appointment of the Commission (favouring an Act of Parliament). However, trust 
grew over the following months as the President appointed Commissioners who 
were widely considered as capable, independent and legitimate. 
Political parties in Ghana have been at the forefront of their constitutional reform 
process. They reached a consensus for the need for reform and agreed upon the 
main issues requiring change. The platform of inter-party dialogue that regroups 
all Secretaries-General has allowed political parties to take the driving seat along 
the road towards progressive democratic reform.
Enhancing	consensus-building	on	contentious	content	issues
The third specific contribution that inter-party dialogue platforms can potentially 
make to constitutional reform processes concerns the ability to build consensus 
on contentious content issues.
As highlighted above, partisan interests significantly influence ongoing 
constitutional reforms. Parties may favour specific electoral systems and political 
systems, and oppose or favour substantial decentralisation in line with their 
interests. Despite the overall importance of transparency, facilitating regular 
informal negotiations behind closed doors at various stages in the process can 
be an important strategy when conducting negotiations on the main content 
issues. The Kenyan case illustrates this well.
3 Constitutional reform and political parties
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Inter-party	negotiations	over	content	issues – Kenya
An inability to agree on the type of political system and the level of devolution  
has frustrated the Kenyan constitutional reform process over the last twenty 
years, and the one time a political agreement was reached, it was not respected. 
Amid the turmoil of continuously shifting alliances, the inability of the political 
class to reach and implement a consensus on the desired political system 
stood out. The two opposing positions – namely, a strong executive president 
in a majority electoral system versus a dual executive with a strong prime 
minister – were closely related to the perceived electoral interests of the main 
political coalitions and their ethnic support bases. Representatives of the main 
ethnic group defended the first position in order to maximise its influence while 
minority groups favoured a dual executive. In line with these interests, one group 
supported a very centralised government structure whereas others aimed for a 
decentralised configuration. 
After the violent presidential election in 2007, political party representatives were 
under internal and external pressure to find a compromise on both issues and to 
complete the lengthy process of constitutional reform. Furthermore, the balance 
of power between the main political actors had shifted. The 2007 elections 
clearly showed that those favouring a dual executive system had the ability to win 
the election, even in a majority system under a single executive. This significantly 
reduced their push for a dual executive. When inter-party negotiations resumed 
at the highest level in early 2010, the opposing coalitions appeared not to be as 
united internally on the two main contentious issues. Combined with the fact that 
no political leader could be seen to be frustrating the finalisation of reforms, all of 
these factors positively impacted upon the inter-party negotiations. 
For many years, the Centre for Multiparty Democracy-Kenya (CMD-K) had 
facilitated informal inter-party dialogue sessions on constitutional content and 
process-related matters. Parallel to the political negotiation process lead by Kofi 
Annan after the troubled elections, CMD-K set up a broad platform of political 
and civil-society representatives. They successfully influenced the agenda of 
the final agreement, in which constitutional reform featured prominently. The 
continuous efforts of inter-party dialogue and pro-active lobbying for the Annan-
led initiative contributed to the adoption of a new Constitution in Kenya.
Constitutional reform processes are highly contentious processes in which 
political parties play a leading role. A mixture of personal, partisan and public 
interests shape parties’ contributions to these processes. This section has 
outlined a number of tools that enable parties to strengthen their mediating 
role between citizens and constitutional reform. It has also pointed out three 
particularly constructive roles performed by platforms of inter-party dialogue.  
As the case studies in Section 4 demonstrate, inter-party relations and 
consensus-building efforts are a key factor in the success of constitutional 
reform processes. The following section briefly highlights the importance of 
constructive relations between political and civil society to constitutional reform.
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Multi-actor	initiatives
The behaviour of individual political parties and inter-party relations affects 
constitutional reform processes. Constructive relations between political parties 
and other stakeholders are, however, also crucial. In short, political parties 
cannot afford to operate in isolation if a constitutional reform process is to be 
socially embedded and its outcome is to be considered legitimate.
This final section suggests a number of actors that could be involved in the 
various phases of constitutional reform in cooperation with political parties.
Networks of cooperation between state institutions, political actors and civic 
organisations are established in different contexts. Nonetheless, two general 
observations can be made about their effectiveness. 
Firstly, in many young democracies in Africa, relations between political and civil 
society organisations are characterised by severe tensions. Discussions over 
the boundaries of each other’s mandate, stringent state regulations restricting 
civil society organisations, the political ambitions of civil society leaders (‘political 
submarines’) and many other factors contribute to these tensions. Empirical 
evidence, however, suggests that constructive cooperation and critical scrutiny 
across the political-social divide is of great importance to the legitimacy of the 
reform process.
Phase Potential	Actors Aim	of	Cooperation
Preparatory • NGOs with constituencies
• Religious institutions
• Interest groups
• Traditional leaders
• Minority groups
• Government branches
Creating a maximum 
coalition on the need for and 
modalities of reform
Awareness and consultation • Media, radio in particular
• ICT organisations
• NGOs with constituencies
• Politicians at all levels
• Traditional leaders
• Electoral commissions
Enabling informed citizens to 
express their viewpoints
Deliberative •  All major groupings  
represented
• Specific focus on minorities
Ensuring maximum inclu-
sivity and legitimacy of the 
new or revised constitution
 
Implementation and  
adoption
•  NGOs with constituencies
•  Public watchdog  
institutions
•  Media organisations
Strengthening public scrutiny 
of the implementation of the 
new or revised constitution
 
figure 3.3
Political parties and potential 
partners for reform
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Secondly, networks of cooperation between political actors, state institutions 
and civil society should clearly go beyond the involvement of a limited number 
of formal non-government organisations (NGOs). The participation of more 
‘unusual suspects’ – for example, traditional leaders, local party representatives, 
religious actors and the private sector – is essential to the social embedding of 
the reform process.
Individual political parties, platforms of inter-party dialogue and multi-actor 
initiatives can thus potentially contribute to processes of constitutional reform. 
Figure 3.4 provides an overview of the potential roles of political parties in 
different capacities throughout the various phases of constitutional reform.
figure 3.4
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This	chapter	presents	and	discusses	eight	specific	experiences	of	consti-
tutional	reform.	The	countries	covered	here	are	Bolivia,	Ghana,	Indonesia,	
Iraq,	Kenya,	Malawi,	Zimbabwe	and	South	Africa.	As	the	case	studies	
illustrate,	every	reform	process	appears	to	be	unique	and	highly	context-
specific.	Even	where	similar	legal	instruments	underpin	processes,	the	
outcomes	vary	considerably,	partly	as	a	result	of	the	political	context.	These	
unique	features	notwithstanding,	it	is	still	possible	to	identify	a	number	of	
common	practices	that	have	either	facilitated	or	thwarted	the	success	of	a	
reform	process.	Most	importantly,	the	commonly	identifiable	best	practices	
bolster	the	guiding	principles	that	were	presented	in	Section	1.
4  Constitutional reform in practice: 
Case studies
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Key	Lessons
•  Constructive role of inter-party dialogue both before and during the reform 
process;
• Clearly defined democratic principles that guide the reforms in advance;
• Legal set-up of the process that enables (executive) manipulation;
• Systematic civic education and popular consultations on reforms; and
•  Political context and popular involvement run the risk of (executive) 
manipulation. 
Ghana’s current constitutional reform process is based on solid political 
foundations. With the support of the NIMD and through the IEA, all the major 
political parties jointly agreed to commission a comprehensive democratic audit 
that has resulted in the ‘Democratic Consolidation Strategy Paper’, a public 
document that identified 30 major legislative weaknesses. In the run-up to the 
2008 elections, the main parties included their commitment to constitutional 
reform in their manifestos. 
Soon after taking office, President John Atta Mills established a Constitution 
Review Commission under the Inquiries Act. Arguably, this means that the 
executive has substantial power over the process and the legal ability to 
influence or even halt it. However, the way the President handled the selection 
of the review Commissioners points to the pivotal role of leadership in such 
a delicate process. In consultation with the Council of State, he strategically 
nominated people across regional, political and civic divides, thus significantly 
enhancing political and public trust in the Commission.
The Commission was mandated to consult ordinary Ghanaians as to their 
constitutional preferences and to draw up new legislative proposals. Before 
commencing, however, the commissioners jointly defined a number of 
basic democratic principles that would guide their work, and which they 
also announced publicly. Whatever the outcome of their work, it had to unite 
Ghanaians and be fully independent. Further, ownership had to lie, as far as 
possible, with ordinary citizens. The main weakness of this initial preparatory 
phase concerned the lack of a well-defined roadmap and timeline for the 
upcoming reform process.
Thanks to effective collaboration with the National Commission for Civic 
Education (NCCE), the Constitutional Review Commission undertook public 
 case study
Ghana
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consultations through information campaigns, consultative meetings organised 
at the local level and site visits to the country’s 170 districts. It aimed to increase 
popular participation through the media, reaching traditional authorities, local 
languages and other interest groups using modern informational technologies, 
including live television debates. 
The Commission received over 80,000 submissions in total. After the 
contributions were divided over twelve different thematic areas, a national 
conference brought together 2300 stakeholders to start building consensus on 
the main content issues at stake. While the Commission is permitted to vote in 
order to adopt final proposals for constitutional amendments, it has indicated 
its preference for unanimity, having agreed on a combination of quantitative 
and qualitative criteria to filter consensus on issues. Legal experts have also 
been continuously consulted to advise on the legality and consistency of draft 
constitutional provisions.
The remainder of the process is still unfolding. Once the Commission finalises 
its report and prepares a draft constitutional amendment bill, this bill will be 
presented to the President. One option will then be for the cabinet to publish 
a white paper for discussion in Parliament. Under the current Constitution, 
any amendment of clauses that are not entrenched in the Constitution may be 
adopted on the basis of a two-thirds majority, while the entrenched clauses 
require a 75% majority in a popular referendum with a minimum 40% turnout.
A second option, which is unlikely in the prevailing situation, is that the President 
may accept the findings of the Commission and then take no further action on 
reforming the Constitution. Observers believe that this option would be too risky  
in terms of its electoral consequences, particularly considering the degree of 
inter-party consensus that the Constitution should be amended.
The successful completion of the ongoing constitutional reforms in Ghana will 
continue to depend on inter-party consensus and dialogue. A critical stage 
may be reached once the process moves into parliamentary proceedings for 
constitutional amendment. Hopefully, the democratic principles espoused in 
Ghana’s political foundations and in the present work of the Commission will 
encourage legislators to temper their partisan or short-term interests in favour  
of the long term public benefit.
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Key	Lessons
• Inter-party negotiations and consensus building on contentious issues; 
•  Smart decision-making mechanisms enabling the adoption of progressive 
reforms; 
•  Successfully containing the impact of partisan interests throughout the 
process;
•  Constructive lobbying and scrutiny by non-governmental organisations; 
and
•  An independent body to monitor the implementation of the new 
Constitution. 
The current (2010) Kenyan Constitution is the product of a long and protracted 
reform process. Amendments to the Constitution in 1990 removed provisions 
imposing one-party rule which dated back to independence in 1963. Civil  
society organisations then began to press for democratic reforms by forming  
an alliance to demand a new constitution. In 1992, they released Kenya We 
Want Constitution and, by 1993, the country’s donors had started to close 
ranks with civil society in demanding far-reaching reforms. 
However, it was not until 1997 that the ruling party, after winning the second 
multi-party elections against a divided opposition, agreed to implement 
constitutional reform. This was partly to reclaim the initiative after the opposition 
parties joined civil society in recognising that the constitutional playing field was 
skewed against them. At the time, opposition parties and civil society had started 
a new initiative calling for a people’s assembly to frame a new constitution, 
arguing that Parliament lacked the legitimacy to do so. Increasing the stakes, 
these bodies publicly appointed a ‘people’s constitutional commission’ to start 
the exercise. 
Against this backdrop, the ruling party enacted a law to allow a ‘review’ of the 
existing Constitution through parliamentary supervision. The new law established 
the organs for constitutional review, including a commission appointed by the 
President, constituency deliberation forums and a national dialogue conference, 
of which all sitting MPs would be members. This would result in promulgation of 
a new constitution by parliamentary vote and presidential assent. 
Once appointed, the chairperson of this commission started to negotiate with the 
civil society people’s commission, which resulted in the merger of the processes 
4 Constitutional reform in practice: Case studies
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backed by civil society and the legislature. Subsequently, a new, merged 
constitutional review commission announced its mandate as a ‘comprehensive 
review’, whose output would be a new constitutional charter rather than a revised 
version of the 1963 charter.
The Constitution Review Commission published a new draft constitution (later 
dubbed the Bomas Draft), along with its report, in 2002. This draft became the 
centrepiece of a national multi-stakeholder dialogue convened at the Bomas 
Centre in Nairobi, following the historic 2002 elections that were won by the 
opposition and which ended Kanu’s 40-year stint in power. 
The key political parties at Bomas later split into two camps as the pre-election 
unity among opposition parties foundered. One party camp (the President’s) led 
a walkout from Bomas in 2004 and refused to participate any further. Later that 
year, the Bomas Talks wound up the dialogue with the Bomas Draft, which was 
presented to the Attorney General for publication and tabling in Parliament. 
This draft proposed a dual executive system with a prime minister as head of 
government. It also proposed far-reaching devolution of power at three levels. 
Although bound by the review legislation to publish the draft Constitution as it 
emerged from Bomas, the Attorney General made alterations that effectively 
re-introduced a presidential system of government and watered down devolution. 
This draft – known as the Wako Draft, after the Attorney General – was presented 
to a national referendum in 2005 November and rejected by 58% of the electorate, 
thus bringing the process to a halt. 
The post-election violence in 2007 and 2008 made painfully clear the urgent 
need for reforms in Kenya’s political architecture. This was recognised within the 
National Accord Agreement that Kofi Annan helped to facilitate between the rival 
parties. However it was obvious from previous reform experiences that any new 
attempt would require stringent safeguards against partisan manipulation of the 
reform process.
The Constitution of Kenya Review Act 2008 identified four main institutions that 
would be involved in the reform process and their mutual relations, namely: a 
Committee of Experts (CoE), the Parliamentary Select Committee, the National 
Assembly and a popular referendum.
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For over a year, the CoE, comprised of five Kenyan experts and assisted by 
three foreign nationals nominated by Kofi Annan, worked hard in the interest 
of tempering national sentiments in the post-conflict period. Of course, this 
was not ‘just another process’ but a continuation of the 2005 referendum. 
The CoE’s mandate was solely to reconcile the contentious issues in the two 
previous constitutional drafts. Public consultation was mandated to obtain more 
information on how to effect reconciliation. The presence of a number of foreign 
experts helped to raise the CoE’s profile and reinforce its credibility as  
a technical, not political, committee.
A two-thirds majority in Parliament was required to adopt the CoE’s proposed 
amendments to the new Constitution. Individual politicians’ and parties’ ability 
to influence the content of the new Constitution on the basis of their specific 
interests was therefore limited.
Nevertheless, inter-party negotiations and consensus building on two conten-
tious issues – namely, the type of political system and the level of devolution 
– were crucial in helping to generate a political support base that was large 
enough to ensure the new Constitution’s adoption by Parliament. Although only 
a simple majority was required, it was clear that this would not be realised if an 
agreement was not reached on these two issues.
On the day the new draft Constitution was tabled in Parliament, 150 amendments 
were proposed but none managed to obtain support from the required two-thirds 
majority. The referendum eventually adopted the document with over two-thirds 
of voters supporting it, and a turnout of over 70%.
Following twenty years of troubled constitution-making, Kenyan citizens finally 
adopted a new Constitution on 4 August 2010. Despite its successful adoption, 
further challenges now lie ahead in terms of implementation. As constitutions 
are not operational documents by themselves they need to be translated into 
subsidiary laws, institutional mechanisms, budgets and policies. This requires 
careful design. In light of the importance of this phase, Kenya has set up a new 
institution to oversee the implementation of the Constitution, a process that is 
likely to take many years.
Kenya
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Key	Lessons
•  Lack of legal entrenchment of reform process when political will was 
available;
•  Substantial efforts to allow public and civic institutions to contribute to 
reforms;
•  National constitutional conferences used to start consensus-building 
process;
• Delays in reform due to the narrow political interests of the executive; and  
• Challenging political climate for public scrutiny of political processes. 
The current constitutional reform process in Malawi started in 2005. The existing 
Constitution (adopted in 1994) has a number of internal inconsistencies, partly 
as a result of numerous amendments reflecting the narrow interests of specific 
political actors. Frequent litigation in the political arena has further strengthened 
the perception of a legal framework that cannot adequately address governance 
issues.
The commencement of the current reform process was weak in both legal and 
political terms. While the Malawian Law Commission (MLC) was commissioned 
by the executive to initiate the process by holding public consultations and 
drawing up a proposal for revision, no legal mechanisms were defined meaning 
there was no guarantee of any follow-up to their work.
Politically speaking, the decision to embark on a reform process was largely 
driven by the executive. After falling out with the ruling United Democratic Front 
(UDF) in early 2005, President Mutharika withdrew from the party and continued 
as an independent President. As he had the support of just a handful of MPs it 
was in his own interests to have a number of constitutional clauses, such as the 
ban on floor crossing, lifted. 
The decision to initiate the reforms was clearly not based on a firm and publicly 
announced inter-party agreement in pursuit of further democratic consolidation. 
This meant that there was no comprehensive agreement on the exact objectives, 
timeframe or roadmap of the process, let alone an agreement on democratic 
principles to guide the reforms.
Nevertheless, the MLC embarked on a substantive awareness-raising and 
consultation process. They pro-actively invited the general public to make 
submissions and organised consultative meetings with a wide range of interest 
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groups. They compiled the contributions in specific ‘Issue Papers’ that were 
presented to 300 participants at the first National Constitutional Conference.
On the basis of this groundwork, a Special Law Commission (SLC) was 
then mandated to review the 1994 Constitution, address the various internal 
discrepancies and come up with recommendations for improvements. Its final 
report was discussed at a second, broader constitutional conference that 
addressed the Constitution article by article. The SLC eventually presented its 
report to Cabinet in August 2007. 
This was the point at which the consequences of the bad political and legal 
foundation of the process became evident. Based on the SLC’s solid preparatory 
work, the Minister of Justice was expected to present reform proposals to 
Parliament; instead, nothing has happened since August 2007.
It is clear that a number of the key constitutional recommendations emerging 
from the consultative phase were considered by the executive to be in conflict 
with its interests. The SLC’s report, for example, proposed a 50% + one voting 
threshold for presidential elections, while President Mutharika had been elected 
on the basis of just 36% of the vote. The Commission also proposed curtailing 
the executive’s mandate in appointing members of the Electoral Commission, 
and this was not readily accepted. Finally, the President had pushed for a reform 
that would enable him to appoint and/or dismiss the Vice President, a measure 
which had not been adopted by the SLC. The President subsequently refrained 
from instructing the Cabinet to introduce a Constitutional Amendment Bill in 
Parliament.
The constitutional reform process and specific issues had not been popularised 
to the extent that immediate protest was easily mobilised. Furthermore, people 
seem now to be paying an increasingly high price for raising their voice in the 
current political climate in Malawi.
While the legal set-up of Malawi’s constitutional reform process is quite similar 
to that of Ghana, the political and popular context in which it has been shaped 
is sharply different. In this respect, the Malawian reform process would have 
benefitted from a much stronger, Kenyan-like, legal entrenchment of the reform 
process at the start and a Ghanaian-like, comprehensive inter-party agreement. 
Malawi
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Key	Lessons
•  Inter-Party Committee collaborates in context of extreme political 
polarisation;
•  Constitutional reform process very dependent on political consensus-
building;
• Continued and enhanced regional political pressure of great importance;
•  Strategic deadlock-breaking mechanisms have saved the process on 
various occasions; 
•  Popular awareness-raising and consultation has been highly politicised; and 
•  Civil society involvement along party lines, with limited space for civic 
scrutiny.
Following the much-disputed, violent and boycotted elections in 2008 and 
under severe international pressure, the three main Zimbabwean political parties 
negotiated a Global Political Agreement (GPA) and formed a ‘unity’ government. 
Constitutional reform became an important component of this agreement, aiming 
to pave the way for new elections to be organised under improved circumstances.
While the current constitutional reform process in Zimbabwe provides the three 
main political parties with a way out of the country’s political deadlock, extreme 
levels of political polarisation are obviously affecting the process itself.
In February 2009, a 25-member Constitution Parliamentary Select Committee 
(COPAC) was set up, comprising MPs from the three main political parties and a 
number of influential traditional authorities. Despite extreme levels of animosity, 
Zimbabwean MPs across the political divide started to meet, establishing a joint 
secretariat and continuing to collaborate on the reform process. Efforts were 
made to establish improved personal bonds between the main actors involved 
and to build mutual trust – or at least reduce distrust.
COPAC’s first task was to raise popular awareness and consult ordinary citizens 
on the main points of constitutional reform. Even the smallest technicalities 
quickly proved politically sensitive and it took weeks of tri-partite negotiations to 
agree on seemingly insignificant issues such as the selection of report writers. 
While ZANU-PF was pushing for civil servants to draw up the reports, both MDCs 
wanted civil-society representatives to do so. Eventually the parties agreed that a 
joint team of representatives from ZANU-PF, MDC-T and MDC-M would draft the 
reports. Within the context of extreme polarisation and mistrust, each step in the 
Zimbabwean reform process has thus required extensive negotiation.
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Progress was, however, slowly realised and the outreach agenda was agreed 
upon at a meeting attended by all stakeholders in July 2009. Over 1400 people 
were then trained and divided into different teams to facilitate the participatory 
sessions at the local level. The parties provided 30% of the team members, while 
the remaining 70% came from civil-society organisations (although the three 
parties had selected them). After more than 12 months of consultation, 30% of 
the citizens told an Afrobarometer team of researchers that they had participated 
directly in the consultations, although only a minority were satisfied with the 
overall quality of those consultations.
The three parties then faced another major challenge that resulted in deadlock, 
namely the question of how they should analyse and regroup the many (contra-
dictory) contributions that had been received. After extensive negotiations they 
again managed to agree on a mechanism that combined both quantitative and 
qualitative strategies of analysis. Extremely polarised inter-party relations have 
continuously impacted upon the constitutional reform process. When overall 
inter-party temperatures rise, the reform debates are immediately affected. This 
was evident, for example, when MDC-T disengaged from the government in the 
final quarter of 2009 as a result of the poor overall implementation of the GPA.  
It was almost impossible for COPAC to see any progress at that time.
Nevertheless, the Zimbabwean constitutional reform process is institutionally 
designed in such a way that it has overcome political hurdles. All three parties 
co-chair the 25-member COPAC and, in the case of deadlock at that level, a 
superior management committee intervenes. This team is comprised of the three 
main GPA negotiators, the co-chairs of the select committee and the Minister  
for Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs.
The timelines for the finalisation of the process are difficult to determine, given 
that the reforms are taking place in an environment that remains volatile. Even 
if COPAC manages to come up with a draft constitution that is endorsed by the 
three parties and accepted by a majority of the citizens in a referendum, the 
articles related to elections still need to be implemented. 
There remains a long way to go. Political dynamics and sudden incidents within 
both ZANU-PF and MDC-T, as well as international pressure, will continue to 
impact on the Zimbabwean constitutional reform process.
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Bolivia
Key	Lessons
•  An inter-party dialogue to break deadlock and a constitutional reform 
process that was won not by the Constituent Assembly (CA) but by fostering 
compromise and mutual acceptance between parties, and between the 
President and Congress;
•  Constitutional reform emerges as a highly political process despite a lack 
of trust in society and is seen as a source of governance problems with 
political parties still playing a dominant role; and
•  The constitutional reform process has indirectly contributed to the 
sharpening of political parties’ ideological orientations due to the structure 
of the negotiations and the holding of two electoral processes within two 
years (elections for the CA and the referendum)
Bolivia has been rated as one of the world’s most unequal countries, with the 
World Bank ranking it second after Brazil in 2003. Bolivia also has the highest 
proportion (about 60%) of indigenous people in Latin America, based on 
indigenous language criteria.
Indigenous movements bringing together 36 communities have succeeded in 
pushing a multi-ethnic agenda in which these communities are all recognised, 
which culminated in Bolivia’s 18th Constitution in 2009. Many saw constitutional 
reform as an opportunity to recreate the state and as a centrepiece of an historical 
‘refoundation’ movement, with its alternative interpretation of the Spanish 
conquest of the region. 
Congress had legally passed the call for a constitutional assembly in 2005, 
following growing demands from social movements and street demonstrations. 
In December of that year, the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) candidate Evo 
Morales, an indigenous leader, won the presidential elections with 56% of the vote 
on the basis of promises that included convoking a Constitutional Assembly (CA). 
Elections to the 255-member CA were held, concurrently with a referendum on 
state unity, in 2006. 
MAS took 137 seats, falling just three seats short of the two-thirds majority 
required by law for the adoption of a new constitution. Moreover, the CA’s 
composition reflected MAS’s dominance in the western regions of the country, 
while the 60 seats of its main rival, the Podemos Party, mostly from the eastern 
regions. 
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The first four months of the CA between November 2006 and February 2007  
were spent debating the technical procedures of drafting, with each group 
viewing the discussions as a tool to further its own interests. MAS had hoped to 
approve each article by a simple majority, while Podemos and its supporters in 
the CA demanded a two-thirds majority. In fact, agreement on this threshold was 
made a pre-condition for further participation in the CA, with divisions in the  
CA leading to violence in the streets and in the regions. 
The CA finally approved its rules of procedure on 14 February 2007, when 81% 
of the members agreed to the overall text and two-thirds voted in favour of 
considering individual articles. A proposal could only be reconsidered if more 
than a third of the assembly proposed an alternative text. Failure to achieve a 
two-third majority would result in an inter-party dialogue mechanism to seek a 
new text; any irreconcilable differences would be settled by popular referendum. 
With MAS’s declared intention of ‘re-founding’ Bolivia, the CA became a 
battleground amongst the highly ambitious members fighting for exclusive 
party positions. This had the potential to ignite conflict, considering that the real 
interests behind the MAS positions included the nationalisation of the (hydro-
carbon-based) economy, land redistribution and the renaissance – if not outright 
political dominance – of indigenous populations. 
The CA conducted a number of public consultations and site visits through its 
thematic committees, though it is not clear to what extent the views collected 
shaped the final Constitution. At the same time, the mobilisation of citizens in 
interest groups and social movements, particularly in a context of low trust in 
relations between political parties and civil society, can be credited with some 
of the considerable gains made by indigenous citizens and the poor in the 
provisions in the new Constitution.
Tensions between the two main parties (MAS and Podemos) intensified 
and made a constructive dialogue almost impossible. A breakthrough in 
the stalemate was created by the Fundación Boliviana para la Democracia 
Multipartidaria (fBDM) when it found two prominent but moderate representatives 
of each party willing to reopen the talks. This generated a now momentum.  
The process was saved and the text was submitted to the CA. A new multi-party 
commission was formed, led by Vice President Álvaro García Linera. However, 
not all of the agreements reached (including the one on regional autonomy)  
were reflected in the Constitution.
On 24 November 2007, the CA approved a preliminary draft of the Constitution 
in full. MAS and its allies claimed that the opposition had boycotted the final 
stages of the Assembly vote and incited violent protests against the CA, forcing 
it to move to a nearby military school for protection. By 8 December 2007 the 
Constituent Assembly had moved its sessions to Oruro, citing safety concerns. 
Most of the members of opposition parties did in fact refuse to participate in the 
vote, although 165 of the 255 delegates turned up. The final draft Constitution 
was approved article by article in a marathon all-night voting session, and 
approval of the draft was announced on 9 December 2007. It was synthesised 
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and modified by an editing commission in La Paz. Leaders of several opposition 
parties and conservative civic committees in five provinces stated they would not 
recognise the new text, claiming it was approved illegally.
On 14 December 2007, the President of the CA presented the complete text to the 
Bolivian National Congress in order to legislate a referendum. The following day, 
marches and rallies were held in favour of the new Constitution in the capital La 
Paz, while in the departmental capital of Santa Cruz rallies were held in favour of 
an extra-constitutional ‘Autonomy Statute’.
The constitutional text was further modified after dialogue between the President 
and opposition parties in September 2008 and in Congress during negotiations 
for a referendum in October 2008.
On 23 October 2008, the Bolivian Congress approved holding a referendum 
on the new Constitution, which duly took place on 25 January 2009. The new 
Constitution came into effect on 7 February 2009, approved by a majority of 
61.7% of Bolivians.
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Key	Lessons
•  The need for buy-in from some of the existing holders of power and 
influence made some reforms possible though not necessarily far-reaching;
•  Negotiations between incumbent and emerging but competing national 
leaders enabled the peaceful transfer of power and the emergence of a 
workable democratic framework;
•  Inter-party bargaining and negotiations frequently determine reforms and 
produce a constitution that is the most viable compromise;
•  It is useful to elaborate up-front on the scope of reform (in this case 
amendments) to an ‘acceptable’ level; and
•  A participatory process has benefits but it has to be accompanied by 
deliberate efforts to ensure that those participating are well informed.
Public demonstrations in Indonesia in 1998 calling for democracy led to the 
army’s removal of the long-serving President Suharto and the introduction of 
reforms. These were aimed at reforming the democratic institutional framework 
to facilitate free elections in 1999, but did not manifest huge ideological 
disparities at this stage. The pressure for elections soon overshadowed calls 
for constitutional reforms, with most of the political parties taking part in the 
elections calling for substantive constitutional change only after they had been 
held. Once concluded, the custodian of the process of constitutional reform 
became the newly elected Parliament (MPR). 
In 1999, a general session of the MPR agreed to undertake constitutional reforms 
based on consensus and negotiations between the parliamentary parties. The 
scope of reform was agreed as amending the 1945 Constitutions, which was 
venerated as an historic document, rather than making a new one from scratch. 
A parliamentary committee (Panitia Ad Hoc 1 or PAH1) reflecting the composition 
and political balance in the MPR was mandated to handle constitutional reform. 
This committee immediately reaffirmed the constitutional principles of the 
1945 Constitution, among them the integrationist pancasila principles and the 
retaining of the presidential system, although these were not further elaborated 
on at the time. 
In addition, it was decided that if no consensus were achieved on a proposal 
for amendment, the original text would continue to apply. For instance, the 
controversial debate on the constitutional role of Islamic religion was resolved in 
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this way when parties unable to muster support for legislation based on sharia law 
conceded the retention of the original text (which in any case was more open-
ended, and could be presented as a win-win outcome).
The parliamentary committee held its almost weekly sessions in public and 
also consulted public opinion via hearings in Jakarta and the provinces. Its 
work was, however, overshadowed by the euphoria of the time and the onset of 
campaigning in the presidential elections. 
In July 2000, the parliamentary committee presented its comprehensive reforms 
outlining agreed proposals to amend the 1945 Constitution and, in some cases, 
proposing alternatives if no consensus was reached. The MPR opened new 
negotiations on the report. Among its membership, supporters of the old order 
(including conservative military representatives) argued that the proposals went 
too far. 
As the spirit of compromise in the parliamentary committee begun to break 
down, the MPR lacked the procedures required to enable deeper discussion 
and compromise building, while some members were too new and inadequately 
informed to discuss the complex report. In reality, only about a third of the 
proposals in the committee’s report were discussed. Complicating the internal 
disagreement within the MPR, other interest groups concerned with constitutional 
reforms, including elites not represented in the MPR, started to attack its 
credibility as the sole organ of review.
By 2002, the MPR had been able to resolve a number of issues, although not 
without controversy. Issues resolved included the question of decentralisation; 
the inclusion of human rights; the status of the DPR as an elected body; ending 
legislative representation of the police and the military; and trimming some of  
the powers of the Executive. 
These resolutions were only possible because a tactical deal between the 
parliamentary committee and the two leading parties in the MPR facilitated the 
emergence of leadership in the executive that would endorse a final amendment 
package in the face of the absence of full consensus on the amendments. The 
deal itself was only possible because it went largely unnoticed in the contexts of 
the upheavals that occurred within the executive for a large part of 2001.
 
NIMD / IDEA / ASC
40
Key	Lessons
•  Political consensus, particularly in divided societies, is fundamental and 
necessary when producing a legitimate constitution;
•  In situations where national actors inevitably and justifiably lack sufficient 
control over their own reform process, a stronger role for (and even 
predetermination by) external actors may be unavoidable;
•  The principle of participation by minorities has to consider the need for 
articulation of their (minority groups’) roles in addition to mere membership 
in the relevant bodies that are involved in the constitutional reform process; 
and
•  The relevant legislation that provides the framework for the reform process 
should strive to be comprehensive by covering all the relevant aspects and 
phases of constitutional reform.
The constitutional reform process focused on in this case study was undertaken 
between 2003 and 2005, while Iraq was still occupied (under UNSC Res1483) 
and being administered by the US-backed Coalition Provisional Authority. In 
January 2005, a transitional national assembly was established to oversee the 
drafting of a constitution that was ratified by a referendum in October 2005. 
With Shiite Arabs making up a 60% majority at the time, concrete guarantees for 
minorities were a key constitutional issue. In 2004, the CPA had been pushed by 
Iraq’s religious leaders to scrap its plan to appoint a national conference to frame 
a constitution. Instead, elections were held for the transitional national assembly 
within the legal framework established by the Law of Administration during the 
Transitional Period (TAL), which itself was the outcome of negotiations between 
the US and the Shiite leadership. 
The TAL is important because it set out not only the provisional structures of 
government and the process of constitution-making but also gave direction to 
the coverage of some issues in the final Constitution. For instance, it stipulated 
that the final Constitution had to be finalised within six months, on 15 August 
2005, and presented for approval by the people no later than 15 October 2005.
 
It also required that the process start afresh, with a newly-elected national 
assembly, in the event of either the referendum’s rejection or the national 
assembly’s inability to produce a draft by mid-August, thus raising the stakes  
for the incumbents. 
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A provision that was not agreed upon by consensus centred on the threshold 
of votes required for the adoption of the Constitution in the referendum. Some 
parties considered that the requirement for the Constitution to be adopted – 
namely, a simple majority vote in favour and approval by two-thirds of voters in  
at least three governorates – was not only too strict but also counter-majority, and 
therefore undemocratic.
In the January 2005 election, which was boycotted by most Sunni Iraqis (in 
fact, Sunni turnout was said to be as low as 2%), a 275-member transitional 
national assembly was elected with a dual mandate to legislate and frame a new 
permanent constitution. The transitional assembly devised its rules of procedure 
and set up a constitutional committee (later called a commission) to handle 
constitutional negotiations and drafting. 
Initially, this committee was composed of 55 members representing the political 
balance in the assembly, where the Shia Iraqis essentially controlled 48% of the 
representation. After lengthy bargaining over numbers, possibly to punish the 
Sunni Iraqis for their election boycott, the constitutional committee was expanded 
to implement increased Sunni participation, with the inclusion of 10 additional 
unelected Sunni members and another 15 as ex officio advisors. The committee 
was then seen as more inclusive and representative, in the final stages of its work. 
While the TAL recognised a role for public consultation on the Constitution, most 
of this was done through the United Nations assistance office; public input was 
only available once most of the constitutional proposals had been settled in the 
committee. The public however had a role to play in the referendum. 
The draft produced by the committee in August 2005 was presented to a 
leadership council with only a few weeks left, according to the TAL, for its 
approval ahead of the referendum. At this stage, the rules were unclear as to 
the exact role of the leaders in relation to the draft. For some observers, this 
presented an opportunity for the US in particular to influence alterations by 
participating in the negotiations of the council, a less inclusive and representative 
body than the constitutional drafting committee. 
The Constitution that emerged, while recognising Iraqi communities and the 
customary norms and principles of religious law that are familiar to the majority 
of ordinary Iraqis, subjected these to international principles of human rights that 
focus on individuals.
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Key	Lessons
•  Although popular participation was crucial to the reform process, it was 
the inter-party ‘sufficient consensus’ that guaranteed the success of the 
process; 
•  The process strived to be as contemporary as possible while at the same 
time not overlooking important historical factors and developments that 
preceded it;
•  The fact that it was given sufficient time made it possible for the various 
sections of society to participate in the process and, ultimately, identify with 
the outcome; and
•  Use of ‘immutable constitutional principles’ provided a valuable 
confidence-building mechanism and safeguarded the objective of the new 
Constitution by ensuring that it complied with what had been agreed at the 
beginning of the process.
‘Talks about talks’ between representatives of the South African government 
and the African National Congress (ANC) had already started in the late 1980s, 
leading to a preliminary agreement to formalise these talks within a framework of 
democratising the Republic and ending apartheid. 
In 1990, President de Klerk, whose National Party (NP) had established apartheid 
rule in 1948, lifted the ban on the ANC and other political parties, allowing them 
to return from exile. By 1992, the talks had crystallised into a multi-party dialogue 
forum known as the Convention for Democratic South Africa (CODESA), which 
broke down but not before agreeing on a key set of constitutional principles. 
The following year, a new platform for talks was launched, known as the Multi 
Party Negotiating Process (MPNP), which drew lessons from previous talks and 
narrowed down its aspirations to negotiations on a constitutional framework 
for the democratic transition. The MPNP’s Negotiating Council represented 
26 political parties, and oversaw seven technical committees, including the 
Technical Committee on Constitutional Matters, which prepared the 1994 Interim 
Constitution.
South Africa then elected a Constituent Assembly (CA) to negotiate and draft a 
permanent constitution within two years. In the same elections, Nelson Mandela 
was elected as the first black President of South Africa, with former President de 
Klerk as his Second Vice President. 
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This power-sharing framework then oversaw the most critical phase of the 
constitution-making process. It was inclusive in terms of the composition of 
the CA, while the secretariat of the CA succeeded in rolling out a consultation 
exercise that generated at least two million submissions from the public. In reality, 
though, the key decisions on constitutional controversies were made in closed 
bilateral talks between the ANC and the NP, under what was then referred to as 
the principle of ‘sufficient consensus’.
The Interim Constitution of 1994 stipulated that the new Constitution could not 
come into effect until three conditions had been met. Firstly, the Constitutional 
Assembly had to adopt the new constitutional text with a two-thirds majority vote; 
secondly, the text had to comply with the constitutional principles agreed to in 
the pre-constitutional phase; and thirdly, the Constitutional Court needed to be 
satisfied that those principles had indeed been respected and reflected in the 
final draft of the constitutional text.
According to the provisions agreed in 1994 by the negotiators, the Constitutional 
Court was required to review the entire text in detail and in the light of 34 
constitutional principles. The text then had to pass a certification judgement in the 
form of an unanimous decision of all eleven judges or by a clear majority. The text 
passed by the CA would not be legally binding unless and until the Constitutional 
Court certified that all its provisions were in compliance with the constitutional 
principles. This procedure was inserted because the process of writing the 
Constitution was a negotiated one, as opposed to a populist or majority exercise.
The certification hearings began on 1 July 1996. The 29 political parties repre-
sented in the CA, together with interest groups, were allowed to submit briefs and 
arguments in what became the largest hearing in South Africa’s legal history. 
On 6 September, the court unanimously ruled that the text adopted in May 1996 
could not be certified because it did not fully satisfy the principles and conditions 
agreed in the multi-party talks. The court also rejected eight of its clauses. This 
forced the CA to reconvene and address the issues in the ruling. On 7 October, the 
CA compromised and voted for a new text, with one party (the IFP) voting against it. 
On 11 October the new text was presented to the Constitutional Court, 
which granted its unanimous approval on 4 December. This text became the 
Constitution of South Africa, which President Nelson Mandela signed into law  
on 10 December 1996.
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A	democratic	constitution	is	legitimised	by	consensus	between	political	
actors	but	also	by	its	inclusion	of	the	voice	of	citizens	and	other	institutions,	
at	least	on	the	most	controversial	or	important	issues.	The	constitutional	
process	should	make	it	possible	to	arrive	not	at	the	most	ideal	constitution	
but	at	a	political	consensus	on	the	most	pressing	constitutional	challenges.
It	should	not	be	assumed	that	the	drafting	team	in	constitutional	processes	
is	credible	and	acceptable	to	everybody,	particularly	the	parties	involved.	If	
the	process	is	based	on	negotiations,	the	mutual	suspicions	involved	tend	
to	crystallise	in	the	drafting	team.	While	drafting	may	appear	to	be	technical	
and	requires	(for	many	participants)	considerable	subject	proficiency,	it	is	
the	fulcrum	of	a	political	process.
Conclusion from these
case studies
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The country cases presented in the previous Section clearly illustrate the 
uniqueness of each constitutional reform process. Differences in political context, 
levels of popular involvement, the extent of socio-political conflicts as well as 
the multiplicity of norms mean that it is difficult to present specific cases of 
constitutional reform as ‘best practices’ that could be of immediate relevance in 
other settings.
The eight case studies do, however, share a number of generic characteristics 
and challenges that are addressed in country-specific ways. All the reform 
processes included efforts at awareness-raising, consensus-building, adoption 
and implementation. Above all, the empirical cases illustrate the political nature 
of constitutional reform and the central role political parties play throughout these 
processes. 
The empirical experiences of constitutional reform demonstrate that contentious 
processes of inter-party negotiation and consensus building do not foster ‘ideal 
constitutions’ or ‘constitutional revolutions’. They predominately generate modest 
but crucial steps along the lengthy path of gradual democratic reform.
This Section aims to provide an overview of the principal phases of constitutional 
reform and to present common features for each of these phases. Examples 
from the case studies in Section 4 are included in order to demonstrate first 
and foremost the importance of inter-party cooperation for keeping the reform 
process on track. It is on these empirical foundations that the guiding principles 
for constitutional reform, which were outlined at the start of this publication, are 
founded.
5  Constitutional reform in 
phases
figure 5.1
Principal phases of constitutional reform
preparations awareness &consultations
content 
deliberations & 
drafting
adoptation &
implementation
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5 Constitutional reform in phases
Constitutional	reform	processes progress through similar phases, each 
with a number of key characteristics that need to be addressed in a country-
specific manner.
Actors involved in processes of constitutional reform are confronted with a 
number of similar challenges within these particular phases. Figure 5.2 provides 
an overview of these recurring issues and offers useful guidance in the search  
for country-specific solutions. 
 
 
These characteristics are briefly clarified in the paragraphs below and are 
illustrated with examples from the case studies. Again, the intention is not to 
present a blueprint for countries embarking on constitutional reform but to 
provide a reference point derived from actual reform experiences and offer input 
for country-specific discussions.
figure 5.2
Characteristics of constitutional reform phases
preparation
• goals
• principles
• roadmap
• timeline
• budget
• institutions
• commitment
• issues
• analysis
• information
• education
• participation
• monitoring
• compiling
• inclusivity
• decision making
• transparancy
• autonomy
• coherence
• feedback
• monitoring
• modifications
• popularisation
• education
• referendum
• subsidiary law
• monitoring
awareness &
consultations
reform
deliberations
adoptation &
implementation
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5.1	Preparatory	phase
Creating a solid foundation for constitutional reform before entering into the often 
lengthy and politically sensitive deliberative process is crucial for a successful 
outcome. Issues to consider during this phase are:
• Defining goals and generating commitment to the reform process 
The cases of Ghana, Indonesia and South Africa sharply contrast with the 
Malawian experience. While in the former cases an inter-party dialogue on the 
objectives and scope of reforms created a political basis for those reforms, 
the latter case was largely driven by the executive from the outset. All the case 
studies illustrate that political parties are principal actors throughout the entire 
constitutional reform process. Fostering inter-party agreements on the goals of 
reform in this initial phase is a crucial starting point.
• Agreeing on basic democratic principles to guide the reform process 
The South African case is most often referred to in this respect. No fewer than  
34 constitutional principles were defined up-front. Furthermore, the Constitutional 
Court was mandated to verify whether the new Constitution was in compliance 
with these basic democratic principles at the end of the reform process. In Ghana, 
the Constitutional Review Commission publicly stipulated at an early stage that 
the reform process should safeguard national unity (content) and be conducted in 
an inclusive and independent manner (process). In the vast country of Indonesia, 
basic principles of national integration and unity informed both the process of 
subsequent reforms and the content deliberations. Legislation that guided the 
reform process in Iraq emphasised (amongst other factors) the need to safeguard 
the rights of minorities. This legislative principal was used later on in the process 
to increase the representation of the Sunni minority within the deliberations.  
These practical experiences illustrate the advantage of reaching an agreement at 
an early stage on a number of democratic principles that guide (and safeguard) 
the subsequent volatile reform process and the content deliberations.
• Reaching consensus about a roadmap, timeline and budget for reform 
Experience shows the importance of spelling out the different steps in the 
entire reform process before engaging in content deliberations. This helps to 
reduce controversies over the process of reform arising in a later phase when 
contradictory views can persist and relations between the participants may be 
tense. The lack of such a clear timetable is one of the main weaknesses of the 
reform process currently underway in Ghana. While a timeline often avoids the 
content deliberations lasting too long, the Iraqi case suggests that having too 
ambitious a timetable also poses challenges. The most recent reform efforts in 
Kenya seem to offer an example of a roadmap and timetable that successfully 
contributed to maintaining the pressure on the actors involved. Finally, a realistic 
(and publicly known) budget for the reform process minimises the risk of a reform 
process becoming stalled halfway because of financial challenges.
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• Selecting the institutions to guide the actual reform process
The institutions involved in constitutional reform are very context specific, as 
can be seen from the case studies. Institutions involved include Constituent 
Assemblies, Constitutional Review Commissions, Committees of Experts, 
Parliamentary Committees, the legislature and the executive. While the 
institutional choices are context-specific, there is a more generic legal and 
political lesson to be learnt too. The Bolivian, Kenyan and Malawian cases in 
particular illustrate the importance of specifying the formal relations between 
the institutions involved in the reforms with the legislature and the executive. 
All the case studies also demonstrate that the institutional choices made 
should primarily enable realistic consensus-building between the main political 
stakeholders on the most pressing constitutional challenges rather than 
establishing too ambitious a process aimed at fostering an ideal constitution.
•  Identifying the principal constitutional issues for consultation and 
debate 
In preparation for popular consultation, stakeholder conferences and political 
negotiations in some of the case studies illustrated the advantages of reaching 
political agreement on the main constitutional issues to be addressed. In Ghana, 
political parties jointly identified 30 principal issues for reform, based on years 
of public debate and academic input. In Zimbabwe, the three parties agreed on 
a priority list for consultation after a lengthy and delicate negotiation process 
and in Kenya the political negotiations centred on two main political matters, 
namely devolution and executive mandate. The views of ordinary citizens cannot 
be collected for every constitutional article later on in the process. A workable 
consultative programme thus requires timely efforts to agree upon a priority list 
of constitutional issues.
• Agreeing on a mechanism to analyse and accommodate popular views
If popular consultative programmes are envisaged, the timing of these initiatives 
is important, as is having in place a broadly accepted mechanism for handling 
divergent popular views. In the Iraqi case, for example, the results of public 
hearings came to the table only when most of the issues had already been 
settled. In Zimbabwe, the lack of a clear mechanism to weigh up and treat 
popular contributions led to political stalemate that was solved only after weeks 
of inter-party negotiations. In Ghana, too, commission members indicated that 
they faced challenges in treating the many popular views expressed there. 
5.2	Awareness	and	consultative	phase
Raising popular awareness of the process and content of constitutional reform 
and enabling participation has the potential to contribute to the legitimacy and 
sustainability of the final outcome.
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• Providing information and civic education to raise popular awareness
If a constitutional reform process allows public participation, it is essential for 
people to be well informed and educated about the major constitutional issues 
at stake, as well as the main characteristics of the reform process itself. In 
Bolivia, Ghana and South Africa, general public information campaigns and civic 
education programmes were organised by the reform institutions on matters of 
content and procedural issues. In Iraq, this task was predominantly undertaken, 
although at a late stage, by the United Nations. The current reform commission 
in Ghana also greatly benefited from the efforts of an institution that has been 
operating since the early 1990s and that is constitutionally mandated to provide 
civic and political education on a structural rather than an ad hoc basis. In 
some cases, there might be a need to set up a monitoring mechanism for these 
information and education programmes to verify their neutrality. In addition to 
these relatively balanced efforts, influential information and civic-education 
programmes are always conducted by political, civic and religious interests 
groups on the basis of very specific interests. Bolivia, Kenya and Zimbabwe 
are obvious examples in this respect. This underscores, once again, the highly 
political nature of every phase in the constitutional reform process.
• Ensuring popular participation in the reform process
People participated extensively in the constitutional reform process in Bolivia, 
Ghana, Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Over two million submissions were 
recorded in South Africa, while in Ghana every district was visited twice and, 
with the use of modern communication tools, this generated more than 80,000 
popular submissions to the Ghana Constitutional Review Commission. In Bolivia 
the various interest groups served as primarily a channel for indirect participation 
while the election of members of the constitutional review body enabled 
democratic representation. This was also true in Iraq, though to a lesser extent 
due to a partial boycott of the elections. In Malawi, stakeholder conferences 
were organised and civil society participated actively, though the linkages to 
ordinary citizens were much weaker. Popular participation has the potential to 
contribute significantly to the legitimacy of the final outcome of a constitutional 
reform process and to lay the foundations for a concluding referendum. On the 
other hand, the Iraqi and Indonesian cases illustrate that limited direct popular 
participation does not necessarily obstruct the process from achieving its goals. 
In cases where popular views have been gathered, there is the need for a 
systematic approach to the compiling of all the contributions made, usually in the 
form of thematic reports to be presented and discussed during the subsequent 
content deliberations and the drafting phase.
5.3	Content	deliberations	and	drafting	phase
There is no blueprint for an institutional setting that enables consensus-building 
on constitutional issues and the successful conclusion of a constitutional reform 
process. Inter-party negotiations form the very heart of this phase and determine 
the outcome to a large extent. Based on the cases in Section 4, this section 
highlights some of the key elements that affect such a political negotiation 
process.
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• Guaranteeing a high level of inclusivity during content deliberations 
Before the actual content negotiations take place, the question of who sits 
around the negotiation table is of utmost importance. Precisely because of 
the need to have all the ‘political’ sections in society represented, 25 Sunni 
representatives were appointed in the transitional assembly in Iraq. After a 
walkout by a substantial number of delegates from the Constituent Assembly 
in Bolivia in 2007, the body lost too much legitimacy to come up with an 
acceptable constitution. In Indonesia, the inclusion of some of the incumbent 
power holders was essential to achievement of reforms by the emerging leaders, 
although it also limited the scope of these reforms. As political negotiations 
mostly determine the success of a constitutional reform process, the content 
deliberations and drafting phase should include all the relevant political 
stakeholders, notably minority groups.
•  Setting-up a strategic decision-making and deadlock-breaking 
mechanism
In the face of numerous contradictory views and divergent interests, the kind of 
decision-making mechanism in place is an important factor in the success of the 
entire constitutional reform process. In South Africa, parties were able to move 
forward once the principle of ‘sufficient consensus’ was adopted, preventing 
the process from being hijacked by minor interests. In Indonesia, the decision 
to maintain the original constitutional text for issues where no consensus for 
reform could be achieved ensured progress. In Kenya, the need to have a 
two-thirds majority in Parliament for specific amendments reduced the impact 
of narrow interests included within the Constitution. In Bolivia, a failure for an 
amendment to obtain two-thirds majority support in the constituent assembly 
activated a deadlock-breaking mechanism of informal inter-party dialogue, 
while a referendum would serve as a last resort. All the case studies illustrate 
the importance of having an agreed decision-making process and deadlocking-
breaking mechanism in place to stimulate consensus building, although this  
is done in a very context-specific way.
• Balancing transparency and informal negotiations 
All the case studies contain examples of crucial moments in the reform process 
when informal discussions and negotiations behind closed doors effectively 
enabled a process of give and take between political adversaries. Nevertheless, 
in order to ensure the legitimacy of the final outcome, popular trust in the process 
is important, as is enabling people to hold their representatives accountable for 
the final outcome, guaranteeing levels of transparency of the actual deliberations.
• Maintaining levels of autonomy in the reform debates
All the case studies convincingly show that constitutional deliberations are 
not technocratic discussions that can be isolated from political interference or 
obtain levels of autonomy ‘above’ politics. In Kenya, inter-party compromises 
reached on difficult topics such as devolution and executive powers were a 
stimulus for the entire reform process. In Zimbabwe, overall inter-party relations 
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and constitutional negotiations determine every tiny step in the lengthy reform 
process. In Bolivia, it was not the Constituent Assembly that managed to come 
up with a text that was publically endorsed; instead, final negotiations between 
the president and Congress and between political parties actually made the 
difference in the end. In Indonesia, too, it was the political compromises made at 
the final stage on a selected number of issues that led to progress. The autonomy 
of constitutional reform processes is thus largely relative. It is for precisely this 
reason that the guiding principles for constitutional reform presented in this 
publication are primarily aimed at inspiring political parties.
• Ensuring legal coherence between the constitutional articles adopted
Numerous legal contradictions between constitutional articles appeared in the 
constitutions drawn up in Eastern Europe in the 1990s and these provoked 
considerable governance challenges in the transition to democracy. The 
involvement of legal experts throughout the deliberative and particularly the 
drafting phase helps to prevent such challenges arising once a constitution  
has been adopted.
• Having feedback and monitoring mechanisms in place
Ensuring that participants in the deliberative phase regularly consult their 
interest groups and provide feedback helps to create a support base for the 
compromises reached. External monitoring of the deliberations and drafting  
has the potential to maintain public trust in the process and to keep people  
well informed.
5.4	Adoption	and	implementation	phase
Although not often recognised as such, the implementation phase forms an 
integral part of the reform process. Constitutional reform remains far from 
effective if the results adopted are not adequately translated into subsidiary  
laws and the institutions set up and then implemented in practice.
• Preventing modifications to inter-party agreements 
Once an inter-party agreement, based on popular or stakeholder consultation, 
has been reached on the revision or drafting of a constitution, the process should 
contain safeguards to ensure that that such an accord is not changed in the final 
stage by powerful groups or individuals. Examples of this occurred in the Kenyan 
case study. While legal dispositions could make it more difficult for political actors 
to change the outcome of a negotiated agreement, publicly expressed inter-party 
commitment to the outcome could also be considered.
• Popularising the final outcome and educating people 
To enable people to come to terms with the adopted changes and a revised or 
new constitution, a political education programme at this stage is an integral part 
of the reform process.
NIMD / IDEA / ASC
52
• Translating constitutional agreements into subsidiary laws
Once a referendum on a proposed constitution has taken place, public and 
international attention usually drops significantly. However, crucial steps in the 
reform process still have to be taken. Translating the constitutional agreements 
into subsidiary laws, newly set-up institutions, policies and budget reallocations 
is crucial. In Kenya, a specific body has been created to monitor the implementa-
tion of the newly adopted constitution to examine whether the reform process 
remains on track in this final stage.
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‘African Human Rights Law document database’; hosted by 
the University of Pretoria, South Africa. After clicking on the 
country name, the Constitution appears under the heading 
‘national legislation’.
»  http://www.chr.up.ac.za/index.php/documents-by-country-
database.html
‘Constitution Finder’: an alphabetical list of almost all the 
world’s national constitutions prepared by volunteers and 
hosted by the University of Richmond, USA.
»  http://confinder.richmond.edu 
The ‘National Constitutions’ website gives access to the 
constitutions of 104 countries. It is part of an initiative by the 
Constitution Society, a private, not-for-profit organisation 
dedicated to promoting principles of constitutional republican 
government that was founded in 1994 and is based in the 
United States.
»  http://www.constitution.org/cons/natlcons.htm 
A list of government constitution websites of most countries 
in the world, sponsored by the US-based Comparative 
Constitutions Project (CCP) and hosted by the University 
of Illinois. The CCP also maintains a repository where 173 
constitutional documents are stored (19 from Africa). The site 
claims to have 720 constitutions that they will make publicly 
available when the copyright status of each text has been 
determined. 
»  http://portal.clinecenter.illinois.edu/cgi-bin/rview_
search?REPOSID=1&mode=browse 
»  http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/
»  http://www.constitutionmaking.org/files/
GovernmentConstitutionWebsites.pdf
Natlex, the database of the International Labour Organisation, 
provides information on social security and related human-
rights legislation.
»  http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex_browse.byCountry?p_
lang=en 
The site of ‘Africa Law Reporter’ offers access to case law, 
secondary literature on legal matters as well as local copies 
of the full text of six African constitutions (Ethiopia, Rwanda, 
Senegal, South Africa, Sudan and Uganda). The initiator of 
this site, Justice Francis M. Ssekandi, the former Justice of 
Appeal in Uganda, intends to include all the constitutions in 
this database in the future.
»  www.jurisafrica.org 
The site of the Eastern Africa Centre for constitutional 
development (Kampala, Uganda) offers access to  
36 national constitutions of African countries.
»  http://www.kituochakatiba.org/index.php?option=com_
docman&task=cat_view&gid=34&Itemid=36 
‘Researching Constitutional Law on the Internet’ provides 
links to world constitutions including Francophone countries 
(currently not functioning) and is prepared and maintained  
by the University of Chicago Library.
»  http://www2.lib.uchicago.edu/~llou/conlaw.html 
World legal materials from Africa: an alphabetical list 
prepared by the Cornell Law Library containing links to the 
constitution in multiple languages as well as to other sites  
of national importance such as ministries, legislation, 
embassies and so on.
»  http://www.law.cornell.edu/world/africa.html#cote 
Guide to Law Online prepared by the Law library of Congress 
(Washington, US), gives access to a plethora of legal sources 
from all the countries in the world.
»  http://www.loc.gov/law/help/guide/nations.php 
Constitutions, treaties and official declarations, collected  
and maintained by Richard Kimber.
»  http://www.politicsresources.net/const.htm 
The ‘International Constitutional Law’ (ICL) project 
provides English translations of and other textual material 
related to constitutional documents. It cross-references 
those documents by applying ICL keys allowing for quick 
comparison of constitutional provisions. Its major editor and 
contributor is Prof. Axel Tschentscher and it is hosted at the 
Universität Bern (Switzerland).
»  http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/
Constitutions available on the internet
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Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
–
TheNetherlandsInstituteforMultipartyDemo-
cracy(nimd)isademocracyassistanceorganisation
establishedbypoliticalpartiesintheNetherlands
tosupportpoliticalpartiesinyoungdemocracies.
nimdspecificallyprovidesassistancetoprocessesof
dialoguebetweenpoliticalpartiesinprogramme
countries,theinstitutionaldevelopmentofpar-
liamentarypartiesandnetworksofcooperation
betweenpoliticalandcivilsociety.nimdadheres
tostrictprinciplesofownership,neutralityand
transparencyandacknowledgesthatdemocracies
arehomegrown.
nimdhasprovidedsupportincontext-specificways
andontherequestofitspartnersinconstitutional
reformprocessesincountriessuchasBolivia,
Ecuador,Ghana,Kenya,Malawi,Tanzania,Zambia
andZimbabwe.
nimdmaintainsasmallknowledgeandcommuni-
cationcentrethatnotonlyfacilitatesSouth-South
exchangesonspecifictopicsbutalsoregularly
developspublications,videosandothermateri-
als.Moreinformationcanbefoundonitswebsite:
www.nimd.org
International IDEA
–
TheInternationalInstituteforDemocracyand
ElectoralAssistance(Internationalidea)isan
intergovernmentalorganisationthatsupports
sustainabledemocracyworldwide.Itsprimary
missionistosupportsustainabledemocraticchange
byprovidingcomparativeknowledge,assistingin
democraticreformandinfluencingpoliciesand
politics.
The African Studies Centre
–
TheAfricanStudiesCentre(asc)istheonly
academicresearchinstituteintheNetherlands
devotedentirelytothestudyofAfrica.Itundertakes
scientificresearchonSub-SaharanAfricainthe
socialsciencesandthehumanities.
TheascmaintainsclosetieswithDutchuniversities
andresearchschoolsandhasvariouslinkswiththe
MinistryofForeignAffairsandnon-government
organisations.Internationally,theaschaswell-es-
tablishedcontactswithacademicnetworksinAfrica
asmostofitsresearchiscarriedoutincooperation
withAfricancolleaguesandinstitutions.
TheaschoststhewebsiteConnecting-Africa,
agatewaytoAfricanresearchinformationand
materialsproducedworldwide.Itprovidesaccess
toover30,000publications,informationonmore
than1,300Africaexpertsandover800organisations
withexpertiseinAfrica.AccesstoConnecting-
AfricaandmoreinformationontheAfricanStudies
Centrecanbefoundonitswebsite:
www.ascleiden.nl
Internationalideahasaspecificconstitution-
buildingprogrammethatraisesawarenessof
theroleconstitution-buildingprocessesplayin
managingconflictandconsolidatingdemocracy.
Thisworkinvolvesprovidingtechnicalassistance,
knowledgeandaccesstolessonlearningtonational
andinternationalactorsengagedinprocessesof
constitution-building.Theinstitutionalsoserves
aglobalcommunityofconstitution-building
practitionersthroughphysicalandvirtualspaces
fordialogue.Moreinformationcanbefoundon
itswebsite:www.idea.int
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ResearchersAwardinrecognitionofhis2005phd
Thesis“DemocratisationAidasaChallengefor
DevelopmentCooperation:AComparativeStudy
ofOverallPoliciesofTwoBilateral(Germanyand
usa)andTwoMultilateral(undpandeu)Develop-
mentAgenciesandhowtheyareimplementedin
Malawi”.
Constitutional Reform Processes
and Political Parties
Principles for Practice
This publication provides a set of guiding principles for constitutional reform based on practical 
experiences of constitutional reform processes in a number of countries (Bolivia, Ghana, Indonesia, 
Iraq, Kenya, Malawi, Zimbabwe and South Africa). While the primary focus of the publication is on the 
role of political parties in constitution-building processes, the publication is also of relevance to other 
actors involved in similar processes as it provides the reader with an overview of common phases, 
characteristics, challenges and guiding principles that may be customised to country specific contexts.
Martin van Vliet / Winluck Wahiu / Augustine Magolowondo
“IpersonallywitnessedthedemocratictransitioninChilefromnearby
whilelivingthere.Today,manypeopleinotherregionsintheworld
arealsobravelytakingtothestreetsdemandingpoliticalfreedomand
economicjustice.Thesecountriesare–orwillbe–confrontedwith
theneedtoelaboratenewconstitutionsthatreflecttheidealsandhopes
ofordinarycitizens.Iamconvincedthattheinternationalcommunity
hasausefulroletoplayinassistingthesecountries.Butmodestyand
respectforcountryownershipisessential.Iverymuchwelcomethis
publicationandamconfidentitmakesausefulcontributiontothe
reformprocessescurrentlyunderwayinsomanycountries.”
Hon. Kathleen Ferrier
Member of Parliament of the Netherlands, 
Former Chair of the African Studies Centre in Leiden
